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NOTES 
The National Court of Appeals: A Constitutional 
"inferior Court"? 
The Freund Commission,1 appointed by Chief Justice Burger in 
1971 to study the caseload of the Supreme Court, has made several 
recommendations for reducing the Court's burden. The most con-
troversial of these suggests that a National Court of Appeals be 
established.2 As envisioned by the Commission, the National Court 
of Appeals would screen all petitions for certiorari that presently 
are filed with the Supreme Court.8 It would have power to deny 
petitions, and such decisions would be final. The Freund Commis-
sion expected that the National Court of Appeals would certify 
between 400 and 500 cases a year, from which the Supreme Court 
would select those cases that it wished to review on the merits.4 The 
National Court of Appeals would also resolve conflicts between the 
courts of appeals in those cases where it felt that the issue involved 
was not of sufficient importance to merit Supreme Court review. In 
these cases also, the National Court of Appeals' decisions would be 
final.5 
Objections have been raised to the necessity for and the prac-
ticality of such a court. These objections are, however, tangential to 
I. The members of the Commission were Prof. Paul A. Freund, Chairman; Prof. 
Alexander M. Bickel; Peter D. Ehrenhaft; Dean Russell D, Niles; Bernard G. Segal; 
Robert L. Stem; and Prof. Charles A. Wright. The formal title of their study is the 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CAsELOAD OF THE SUPREME 
COURT (1972) [hereinafter REPORT]. 
2. Other proposals by the Commission were (1) to eliminate all direct appeals to 
the Supreme Court from three-judge district courts; (2) to eliminate three-judge district 
courts; (3) to eliminate direct appeal to the Supreme Court from district courts in 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) and antitrust cases; (4) to substitute certiorari 
for appeal in those cases in which appeal is the present review procedure; (5) to create 
a nonjudicial board to investigate mistreatment of prisoners and collateral attacks on 
convictions; and (6) to increase staff support and improve secretarial facilities for 
Supreme Court Justices and their clerks. Id. at 47-48. 
3. This would include review of those petitions that would replace what arc pre-
sently direct appeals. No constitutional objections have been raised to the proposal to 
replace appeal with certiorari, and none seem to e.xist. Cases presently reviewed by 
appeal are three-judge district court cases; antitrust, ICC, and Communications Act 
cases under the Expediting Act; certain criminal cases; decisions invalidating acts of 
Congress; certain appeals from the circuit courts of appeals; and appeals from state 
supreme court decisions invalidating a federal law or treaty or validating a state law 
under the United States Constitution. Id. at 25-38. 
Since the real distinction between appeal and certiorari is diminishing, if it has not 
already entirely disappeared, id. at 25-26, and since there seems to be nothing in the 
above types of cases that would inherently require one procedure rather than the 
other, the proposal would seem to be as constitutional as the Act of Feb. 13, 1925, 
ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936, which greatly extended the use of certiorari, as opposed to appeal. 
4. REPORT, supra note I, at 20-21. 
5. Id. at 21. 
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the subject of this Note and are fully discussed elsewhere.6 An addi-
tional question has been raised regarding the constitutionality of 
the proposed court. Article III, section 1, of the Constitution pro-
vides: "The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in 
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may 
from time to time ordain and establish." Several commentators have 
challenged the proposed court as violative of the provision for "one 
supreme Court."7 There is, however, another approach to the con-
stitutionality problem: Article I, section 8, clause 9,8 only authorizes 
the Congress to create those courts that are "inferior." It can be 
argued that the proposed National Court of Appeals would not be 
an inferior court, since none of its decisions would be subject to 
Supreme Court review. In addition, it can be argued that the estab-
lishment of a National Court of Appeals would delegate the appellate 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in derogation of the clause estab-
lishing the Supreme Court and in derogation of the tripartite gov-
ernmental framework set up in the Constitution. 
I. THE MEANING OF "INFERIOR COURT" 
The argument that the National Court of Appeals is not an in-
ferior court is based on the premise that "inferior," as used in the 
Constitution, is a term of art and therefore should not be interpreted 
as merely granting to Congress the general authority to establish 
courts other than the Supreme Court. 
When interpreting the Constitution it is important to remember 
that "every word must have its due force, and appropriate meaning; 
for it is evident from the whole instrument, that no word was un-
necessarily used, or needlessly added .... Every word appears to have 
been weighed with the utmost deliberation, and its force and effect 
to have been fully understood."9 Several factors indicate that "in-
ferior" is a term of art. First, since the framers chose to use the word 
"inferior" in both clauses that involve the establishment of courts, 
6. See Brennan, The National Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 473 (1973); Gressman, The Constitution v. The Freund Report, 41 GEo. WASH. L. 
REv. 951 (1973); Gressman, The National Court of Appeals: A Dissent, 59 A.B.A.J. 253 
(1973); Poe, Schmidt &: Whalen, A National Court of Appeals: A Dissenting View, 67 
Nw. U. L. REv. 842 (1973); Retired Chief Justice Warren Attacks, Chief Justice Burger 
Defends Freund Study Group's Composition and Proposal, 59 A.B.A.J. 721, 724-30 (1973). 
7. Gressman, 41 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 951, supra note 6, at 960-64; Gressman, 59 
A.B.A.J. 253, supra note 6, at 255-56; Poe, Schmidt&: Whalen, supra note 6, at 855; 
59 A.B.A.J. 721, supra note 6, at 729-30. 
8. "The Congress shall have Power ••• To constitute Tribunals inferior to the 
supreme Court." U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. The Supreme Court has stated that 
article I, section 8, clause 9 "plainly relates" to article m, section I. Glidden Co. v. 
Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 543 (1962). 
9. Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 588 (1938), quoting Holmes v. Jennison, 
39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 570-71 (1840) (Taney, C.J.). See also Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 33ll-34 (1816). 
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it would seem that a particular meaning was contemplated. Second, 
in Article III, section I, "inferior" courts, when read in light of "one 
supreme Court," seems to indicate a relationship between two dis-
tinct levels of courts that would be absent if the clause were inter-
preted to mean one supreme court and other courts. Similarly, in 
Article I, section 8, clause 9, the phrase "[t]ribunals inferior to the 
supreme Court" seems to suggest a more specific meaning than does 
the phrase "other than the supreme court." Thus, it appears that 
the framers had a specific meaning in mind, although that meaning 
remains unclear. 
A. The Common Law 
At common law there were superior and inferior courts.10 Superior 
courts were courts of general jurisdiction and included the Court of 
Common Pleas, the King's Bench, the Court of Exchequer, and the 
Court of Chancery.11 The court of last resort was the House of 
Lords.12 It should be noted that although the decisions of the Court 
of Common Pleas were subject to review by the King's Bench,18 
Common Pleas was still a "superior court.'' Additionally, although 
Exchequer, according to Blackstone, was inferior in rank to Chancery 
and to the King's Bench and Common Pleas,14 it was a superior 
court.15 
The inferior courts had cognizance of a very narrow range of 
cases, since their jurisdiction was limited to a certain type of action 
or to a certain geographical area, or both.16 In addition, these courts 
were generally not courts of record.17 King's Bench had broad super-
10. See M. BIGELOW, HISTORY OF PROCEDURE IN ENGLAND 319-20 (1880). 
11. See generally 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES •37-0 59. 
12. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMl\IBNTARIES •57. 
13. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, CO!lll\IBNTARIES •41. 
14. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMl\IBNTARIES •44. 
15. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COllll\IBNTARIES •45. 
16. For example, the court of piepoudre was an inferior court of record that was 
incident to every fair and market and had cognizance of all commercial injuries that 
occurred at the specific fair or market at the time the market was held. 
The court baron was an inferior court of record that was incident to every manor 
and had cognizance of all land claim controversies within the manor. It also heard 
pleas in debt or trespass on the case where the value in question was less than 40 
shillings. 
The hundred court was a larger court baron that was held for the inhabitants of 
a particular hundred instead of a manor. It was identical to a court baron except for 
its larger territorial jurisdiction. 
The county court was an inferior court not of record that was incident to the 
jurisdiction of the sheriff. It had cognizance of cases in debt or damages less than 40 
shillings. It also had cognizance of many real actions. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
•32-•37. 
17. In those cases where the inferior courts were of record their proceedings and 
judgments were treated with the same respect given those of superior courts. However, 
where the inferior courts were not of record their proceedings could be impeached in 
a superior court proceeding. M. BIGELOW, supra note 10, at 319-20; 3 ,v. BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES •25, 
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intending control18 over the inferior courts to ensure that they acted 
within their authority,19 and the decisions of inferior courts were 
subject to review by the lower-ranking superior courts.20 
However, there were apparently some cases in which certain in-
ferior courts were not subject to review. No writ of error lay from 
the inferior court of record at London, nor from other courts where 
the municipal bylaws expressly limited a cause of action to the local 
court.21 There were also cases, defined by the Statute of Gloucester,22 
where the county courts had jurisdiction exclusive of the King's 
superior courts if the amount in controversy was less than 40 shill-
ings.23 Although the Statute is ambiguous, it seems that in these 
cases no appeal lay to the superior courts.24 Thus, although it was 
not the general rule, unlike the lower-ranking superior courts from 
which an appeal always lay to the higher-level superior courts,25 cer-
tain inferior courts could and did have limited classes of cases in 
which no substantive review lay to the superior courts. Even in these 
cases, however, the inferior courts remained subject to the super-
intending control of King's Bench.26 
Because inferior courts were of very limited jurisdiction, it was 
necessary to ensure that they dealt ·with the issue of jurisdiction. 
Thus, the technical rule arose that judgments of inferior courts, un-
like those of superior courts, were void if jurisdiction was not alleged 
in the proceedings.27 This rule would apparently apply even in those 
cases where no substantive appeal lay from an inferior to a superior 
court.28 This technical distinction between inferior and superior 
18. "Superintending control" is used here to describe the power to issue the extra-
ordinary writs, such as mandamus, prohibition, and quo warranto, and is to be distin-
guished from substantive review. 
19. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COM?.ffi?-.'TARIES •42. 
20. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMr.mNTAIUES •31-•37, •41. The procedure for review was 
by writ of false judgment for courts not of record. Apparently, this procedure was in 
the nature of a writ of error. The separate procedure arose solely because these courts 
lacked an official record. 1 W. Hor.nswoRnr, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 73 n.7, 73-74, 
201 (7th ed. rev. 1956). See generally 5 id. at 157-60 (1924). 
21. Ballard v. Bennet, 97 Eng. Rep. 557, 2 Burr. 775 (1759); 3 W. BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES •44 n.19. 
22. 6 Edw. 1, c. 8 (1278). 
23. The apparent purpose of the statute was to keep frivolous claims out of the 
superior courts. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 20, at 74. See also 43 Eliz. 1, c. 6 (1601). 
The statutes gradually fell into disuse. 1 W. HoLDswo&nr, supra, at 74; 3 W. BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTAIUES •36. 
24. The Statute contains the phrase "in such pleas ••• where appeal lieth not." It 
is not clear what this language means, but it does suggest that there were cases that 
could not be appealed. 
25. See 3 w. BLACKSTONE, CoMr.mNTARIES •44, •46, •56-•5s. 
26. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES •42. 
27, See note 29 and accompanying text infra. 
28. See 3 w. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES •42. 
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courts was significant. For example, in Adney v. Vernon20 the de-
fendant raised an earlier recovery by the plaintiff in an inferior court 
in Worcester as a bar to the instant action in the Court of Common 
Pleas. The court dismissed the plea and allowed the second recovery: 
"It is not she·wn in the Plea, that the Cause of action arose within 
the Jurisdiction, and then the Judgment is coram non judice, and 
void. It is true that the Declaration set forth in the Plea here, it is 
said to be infra jurisdictionem Curaie, but that is not sufficient, for 
that is traversable, but only that which is alleged in the Plea 
here .... "80 
To summarize the distinctions between inferior and superior 
courts at common law: (1) The former were of very limited and 
special jurisdiction, while the latter were of general jurisdiction; (2) 
the former were generally courts not of record; (3) while the deci-
sions of both the inferior courts and lower-ranking superior courts 
were normally subject to review, only certain inferior court decisions 
were ever free from substantive review by a higher-ranking court; 
and (4) the judgments of inferior courts were void if jurisdiction 
was not affirmatively alleged in their proceedings. This last distinc-
tion is probably the best recognized31 and seems to be an essential 
part of the common law definition of "inferior court." 
B. The Colonial Courts 
The court systems in the colonies before the Revolution followed 
the general outline of the English courts: There was a system of local 
courts for petty causes, a central court of general jurisdiction, a 
29. 83 Eng. Rep. 671, 3 Levinz 243 (Common Pleas, 1685). See also Frumpton v, 
Pettis, 83 Eng. Rep. 557, 3 Levinz 23 (Common Pleas, 1681), where the defendant 
pleaded as a bar to an action in the Court of Common Pleas an earlier judgment in 
his favor in the court of London, an inferior court. Common Pleas dismissed his 
defense on the ground that London had no jurisdiction and that "judgment there 
given of a Thing out of the Jurisdiction is absolutely void, and Advantage may be 
taken thereof in Pleading, without Reversal by Writ of Error •••• " 83 ENG. REP. at 
557, 3 Levinz at 23. 
In Briscoe v. Stephens, 130 Eng. Rep. 288, 2 Bing. 213 (Common Pleas, 1824), the 
plaintiff, defendant in a previous trial in the inferior court of record at Ludlow in 
Salop, sought to have that court's judgment against him declared void. The Court of 
Common Pleas did so, but because the inferior court was of record this was done 
because jurisdiction did not in fact exist, rather than because the record failed to show 
jurisdiction. The court went on to review the rule regarding inferior courts and 
approved the language of an earlier case, reported in I Roll. Ahr., Escape F., pl. 3 
(1668), where the court had ruled that unless the jurisdiction of the inferior court was 
affirmatively alleged, the proceedings therein were coram non judice and "void to all 
intents and purposes." 130 ENG. REP. at 290, 2 Bing. at 218-19. 
30. 83 ENG. REP. at 671, 3 Levinz at 243-44. "Traversable" means deniable. 
31. See, e.g., w. ANDERSON, DICTIONARY OF LAw 275 (1893); J. BALLANTINE, LAW 
DICTIONARY 643 (2d ed. 1948); BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 918 (4th ed. 1951): BOUVIER'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1562 (8th ed. rev. 1914); I B. POPE, LEGAL DEFINITIONS 756 (1919). 
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court of equity, and a supreme court.32 There was, however, no 
consensus among the colonies in naming the various courts.33 In 
addition, the term "inferior courts," at least in Massachusetts, did 
not appear to have a technical meaning; the title used in that state 
-"Inferior Courts of Common Pleas"34-would be self-contradictory 
if understood in the common law sense. It does not seem that the 
framers could have intended a specific colonial meaning for the 
term "inferior courts." 
C. The Constitution 
Nowhere in the debates at the Constitutional Covention was the 
meaning of "inferior Courts" discussed,35 and the inferences that 
can be drawn from the Convention indirectly are inconclusive. The 
original proposal for the judiciary was for "one or more supreme 
tribunals, and .•. inferior tribunals to be chosen by the National 
Legislature .•.. "36 This language was rejected in favor of "One 
supreme tribunal, and ... one or more inferior tribunals."37 It can 
be inferred from this choice that the framers did not intend to adopt 
the common law meaning of inferior courts. "One or more" supreme 
tribunals, originally proposed, would seem to parallel the superior 
English courts; "inferior tribunals" in the original suggestion would 
then apparently be patterned after common law inferior courts. But 
in a system with only one supreme tribunal and one or more in-
ferior courts, "inferior" would seem to have a different meaning. If 
"inferior" in the final language were understood to carry the full 
significance of the common law meaning, the federal system would 
have only one court of general jurisdiction-the Supreme Court. 
This would be a significant deviation from the court systems of both 
eighteenth-century England and the American colonies, each of 
which had a system of superior courts. In addition, a system with 
only one court of general jurisdiction seems too impractical to have 
been what the framers envisioned. 
32. See Pound, Organization of Courts, AM. JUD. Soc. BULL. No. VI, at 1, 11-12 
(1916). 
33. See A. CHESTER, LEGAL AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 158, 224, 265-85 
(1911); G. CHUMBLEY, COLONIAL JUSTICE IN VmGINIA 5, 58-73 (1938); W. CLEVENGER, THE 
COURTS OF NEW JERSEY: THEm ORIGIN, Co:MPosmoN AND JURISDICTION 77-91 (1903); 
W. DAVIS, HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY OF MASSACHUSETIS 16, 33-34, 54-55, 73-74 (1900); 
I. GRUBB, THE COLONIAL AND STATE JUDICIARY OF DELAWARE 15-16, 22 (1897); W. LOYD, 
THE EARI.Y COURTS OF PENNSYLVANIA 77-78 (1910); E. PAGE, JUDICIAL BEGINNINGS IN NEW 
HAMPSHIRE 1640-1700, at 11-42 (1959); Eaton, The Development of the Judicial System 
in Rhode Island, 14 YALE L.J. 148, 151 (1905). 
34. W. DAVIS, supra note 33, at 16, 55. 
35. See THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (M. Farrand ed. 1937) 
[hereinafter FARRAND]. 
36. l FARRAND, supra note 35, at 21. 
37. Id. at 95. 
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James Madison, arguing against the use of state courts as in-
ferior federal courts and for the creation of an independent federal 
system of inferior courts, expressed the view that 
unless inferior tribunals were dispersed throughout the Republic 
·with final jurisdiction in many cases, appeals would be multiplied to 
a most oppressive degree; that besides, an appeal would not in many 
cases be a remedy. What was to be done after improper Verdicts in 
State tribunals obtained under the biased directions of an undi-
rected jury? To remand the cause for a new trial would answer no 
purpose. To order a new trial at the supreme bar would oblige the 
parties to bring up their witnesses, tho' ever so distant from the 
seat of the Court.38 
Madison apparently wanted inferior courts to be of final jurisdic-
tion in many cases. It cannot be determined from this passage, how-
ever, whether he was adopting a common law definition of infer-
iority, whether he envisioned a specific role for superintending con-
trol of inferior courts by the Supreme Court, or whether he envi-
sioned the inferior courts as being of limited or general jurisdiction.80 
Following the Convention, in the Federalist No. 8140 Alexander 
Hamilton discussed the distribution of judicial authority. In a foot-
note he dismissed as absurd the fear that the state county courts, 
knmm as "inferior courts," would be abolished or supplanted by 
inferior federal courts: "[T]he expressions of the constitution are to 
constitute 'tribunals INFERIOR TO THE SUPREME COURT,' 
and the evident design of the provision is, to enable the institution 
of local courts, subordinate to the supreme ..• .''41 This notion of 
subordination is not inconsistent with the common law definition 
of "inferior courts," which were subordinate to the superior courts. 
He later states, however, that "a very small portion of original juris-
diction has been reserved to the supreme court, and the rest con-
signed to the subordinate tribunals.''42 In England, both the inferior 
courts and lower-ranking superior courts were subordinate tribu-
38. Id. at 124 (emphasis original). 
39. It can be argued that Madison's desire for finality indicates a preference for the 
common law definition of inferior courts. This argument seems strained. It must be 
remembered that the finality of inferior court judgments was a very limited exception 
to their general appellate inferiority. Madison's idea of finality seems to encompass 
a broad range of cases. Therefore, to argue that he saw the lower federal courts as the 
equivalent of common law inferior courts would be to argue that he envisioned this 
jurisdictional exception as swallowing the general rule. Moreover, to argue that 
Madison understood "inferior courts" in the common law sense leads to the conclusion 
that he envisioned the Supreme Court as playing the role of Common Pleas, King's 
Bench, and the House of Lords, an inference that seems too broad to derive from 
sketchy convention notes. 
40. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 595-611 G• Hamilton ed. 1868) (A, Hamilton), 
41. Id. at 599 (emphasis original). 
42, Id. at 605. 
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nals, but only the former were technically "inferior courts." Hamil-
ton, it could therefore be argued, viewed the constitutional defini-
tion of inferior courts as encompassing both common law inferior 
courts and lower-ranking superior courts; consequently, the com-
mon law definition would not seem to apply to his understanding of 
the term. 
The text of the Constitution is an inconclusive as its drafting 
history. Article 1, section 8, clause 9, empowers the legislature "[t]o 
constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court." This provision 
relates to the "inferior Courts" of article III, section 1.48 Hamilton's 
notion of "subordination"44 grows out of article I, section 8, clause 
9. Of course, such subordination might well apply in a supervisory 
sense. At common law the decisions of a few inferior courts were 
immune from review, but subject to supervision. It could be argued 
that the subordination inherent in the phrase "tribunals inferior to" 
can be construed as allowing a subordination in this narrow, com-
mon law sense.45 This would allow for inferior tribunals of final 
jurisdiction in many cases, as Madison desired. The exceptions-and-
regulations clause of article III, section 2,46 supports this argument. 
But to argue from a very limited number of common law inferior 
courts that were free from substantive appeal in a limited number 
of cases to the conclusion that "inferior Courts" as used in the Con-
stitution includes the possibility of courts essentially free of appellate 
review is to argue for an unwarranted extension of a minor com-
mon law practice. More importantly, the use of the word in colonial 
America had no fixed meaning, much less one incorporating this 
special, purely supervisory relationship between lower- and higher-
level courts. 
The phrase "[t]ribunals inferior to the supreme Court" seems 
to refer to some sort of relationship between the courts. The rela-
tionship indicated, however, is not necessarily the same as that 
between common law inferior and superior courts. The ambiguity 
43. See note 8 supra. 
44. See text accompanying note 41 supra. 
45. See text accompanying notes 21-26 supra. 
46. Art. m, sec. 2, reads in part: 
Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, 
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, 
or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambas-
sadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime 
Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to 
Controversies benveen two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another 
State;-between Citizens of different States;-benveen Citizens of the same State 
claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citi-
zens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. 
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and 
those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Juris-
diction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have 
appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under 
such Regulations as the Congress shall make. 
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of the possible relationship is suggested, for example, by Blackstone, 
who commented that the Court of Exchequer was of inferior rank 
but was, nonetheless, a superior court.47 As pointed out above, the 
experience in the colonies indicates that the framers did not use "in-
ferior" in a common law sense, but they may have intended it to 
designate a relationship, the boundaries of which are not clear from 
the term alone. Thus, the most that can be said about the language 
of the Constitution and the intent of the framers regarding 
"inferior Courts" is that the definition of the term is uncertain. 
D. The Judiciary Act of 1789 
With the definition of "inferior Courts" left unresolved by the 
history and words of the Constitution, the interpretation given these 
words by the legislature that created the inferior federal courts 
might be helpful. The Judiciary Act of 178948 created thirteen dis-
tricts with a district court in each.49 These districts were combined 
into three circuits, each with a circuit court.60 The district courts 
were given jurisdiction of minor crimes and offenses "cognizable 
under the authority of the United States" and exclusive original 
jurisdiction over all admiralty and maritime civil causes.61 
The circuit courts were comprised of one district judge and two 
Supreme Court justices.52 The circuit courts were given concurrent 
jurisdiction with the state courts in civil suits of more than 500 
dollars where the United States was a plaintiff, an alien was a party, 
or there was diversity of citizenship between the parties, as well as 
jurisdiction over all crimes cognizable under authority of the United 
States.53 In addition, the circuit courts were given appellate juris-
diction over the district courts in admiralty and maritime suits in-
volving more than 300 dollars64 and in civil actions of more than 
50 dollars. M 
47. See text accompanying notes 14-15 supra. 
48. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. 
49. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §§ 2-3, 1 Stat. 73. 
50. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 74. The district courts of Maine and 
Kentucky were not assigned to any circuit. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 74. 
See also note 51 infra. 
51. Act of Sept. 24-, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 76. The district courts were also given 
jurisdiction (concurrent with the circuit courts and state courts) of tort cases where an 
alien claimed a violation of the law of nations or of a treaty of the United States, and 
of common law tort cases brought by the United States. In addition, they were given 
jurisdiction of suits against consuls or vice-consuls. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 
Stat. 76. The district courts in Maine and Kentucky were given the jurisdiction of 
circuit courts. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 10, 1 Stat. 77. 
52. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 74. 
53. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 78. The circuit courts' jurisdiction 
over minor crimes was concurrent with that of the district courts. 
54-. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 21, 1 Stat. 83. 
55. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat. 84. 
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The lower federal courts were established in accordance with 
Madison's view that they be of final jurisdiction in many cases. The 
Supreme Court's scope of review was extremely narrow. No appeal 
lay to the Supreme Court in criminal cases; resort to that Court in 
those cases was only by writ of habeas corpus.56 There was also no 
appeal in civil actions involving less than 2000 dollars.57 Thus, the 
relation between the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts 
was more like that between the superior courts and some inferior 
courts of the common law, than between the higher and lower level 
superior courts. 
On the other hand, Professor Goebel has noted that, while "the 
District Courts were viewed primarily as courts of special jurisdic-
tion, the Circuit Courts were erected as courts of general original 
jurisdiction, so far as such was envisaged by the Constitution."58 
There is one judicial pronouncement to the contrary. In Turner v. 
Bank of North America59 Chief Justice Ellsworth noted that "[a] 
circuit court ... is of limited jurisdiction; and has cognizance, not 
of cases generally, but only of a few specially circumstanced, amount-
ing to a small proportion of the cases, which an unlimited jurisdic-
tion would embrace.''60 In this case, the plaintiffs had failed ade-
quately to describe the citizenship of the assignor of a promissory 
note. In addition to jurisdiction over the parties before it, section 11 
of the Judiciary Act61 required that a court have jurisdiction over 
the original parties to the note, even if they were not involved in 
the suit. Chief Justice Ellsworth, in setting forth the premise that 
circuit courts suffered certain jurisdictional limitations, seems to 
have overstated his case; the jurisdiction of the circuit courts was 
limited by the practical amount in controversy and by federal con-
cerns, but the jurisdiction was as broad as it could be under the 
Constitution.62 The general jurisdiction given to the circuit courts 
is not in conformity with the character of inferior courts at common 
law. 
Thus, two relevant conclusions can be drawn from the Act. First, 
the lower federal courts were courts of final jurisdiction in a select 
number of cases. Second, "inferior Courts" does not seem to indicate 
the common law inferiority in the sense of limited jurisdiction.63 
56. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81. 
57. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat. 84. 
58. J. GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF TiiE SUPREME COURT OF TiiE UNITED STATES 475 (1971). 
See also Pound, supra note 32, at 15. Compare note 51 supra and accompanying text 
with text accompanying notes 53-55 supra. 
59. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8 (1799). 
60. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 11. 
61. Act of Sept. 24, l 789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 79. 
62. See text accompanying note 58 supra. 
63. J. GoEBEL, JR., supra note 58, at 785. 
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E. Court Construction64 
Turnerv. Bank of North America, noted previously, dealt directly 
with the definition of "inferior courts": 
A circuit court, though an inferior court, in the language of the 
constitution, is not so in the language of the common law; nor are 
its proceedings subject to the scrutiny of those narrow rules which 
the caution or jealousy of the courts at Westminister long applied 
to courts of that denomination; but are entitled to as liberal intend-
ments, or presumptions, in favour of their regularity, as those of any 
supreme court. A circuit court, however, is of limited jurisdiction; 
and has cognizance, not of cases generally, but only of a few specially 
circumstanced, amounting to a small proportion of the cases, which 
an unlimited jurisdiction would embrace.05 
In this discussion Chief Justice Ellsworth notes that the con-
stitutional definition of "inferior courts" is different from the defini-
tion used at common law.66. His statement on limited jurisdiction, 
64. Because the interpretation of the term "inferior courts" involves the subtleties 
of the United States Constitution, only cases involving federal courts arc applicable 
here. Several states have had to decide this or similar questions under their own 
constitutions. Those state cases that have applied the jurisdictional or common law 
definition are Walkinshaw v. O'Brien, 130 Conn. 122, 32 A.2d 547 (1943); In re Hcard's 
Guardianship, 174 Miss. 37, 163 S. 685 (1935); Grimball v. C.W. Parham Co., 96 S.C. 
443, 81 S.E. 186 (1913); State v. Fillebrown, 2 S.C. 404 (1870). State cases that have 
applied the appellate or supervisory definition are Ex parte State ex rel. Charmichacl, 
251 Ala. 57, 36 S.2d 451 (1948); Sanders v. State, 55 Ala. 42 (1876); Ex parte Roundtree, 
51 Ala. 42 (1874); Nugent v. State, 18 Ala. 521 (1851); Laizure v. Baker, 91 Colo. 48, 
11 P.2d 560 (1932); Sokoll v. Municipal Court, 276 Ill. App. 102, afjd., 359 Ill. 102, 194 
N.E. 249 (1934); Gannon v. Lake Circuit Court, 223 Ind. 375, 61 N.E.2d 168 (1945); 
State v. Medler, 19 N.M. 252, 142 P. 376 (1914); Haddock v. Johnson, 80 Okla. 250, 194 
P. 1077 (1921); Kirkwood v. Washington County, 32 Ore. 568, 52 P. 568 (1898). Missouri 
has held that a court is inferior if it is either of limited jurisdiction or subject to 
appellate review. Bailey v. Winn, 113 Mo. 155, 20 S.W. 21 (1892); State v. Daniels, 66 
Mo. 192 (1877). 
65. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 11. 
66. See also M'Cormick v. Sullivant, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 192 (1825) ("(The inferior 
courts of the United States] are all of limited jurisdiction; but they are not, on that 
account, inferior courts, in the technical sense of those words, whose judgments, taken 
alone, are to be disregarded"); Evers v. Watson, 156 U.S. 527, 533 (1895) ("the courts 
of the United States, though of limited, were not of inferior jurisdiction"); Des Moines 
Navigation & R.R. Co. v. Iowa Homestead Co., 123 U.S. 553, 558 (1887), For applica-
tion of these ideas to the criminal context, see Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 
(1830). In that case the Supreme Court held that a district court had general jurisdic• 
tion of criminal cases and therefore held that its decisions were binding until reversed, 
"[H)ad any offense against the laws of the United States been in fact committed, the 
Circuit Court for the District of Columbia could take cognizance of it. The question 
whether any offense was or was not committed ••• was a question which that court 
was competent to decide. If its judgment was erroneous, ••• still it is a judgment, and, 
until reversed, cannot be disregarded." 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 206. In Grignon's Lessee v, 
Astor, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 319 (1844), the appellants contended that the judgment of a 
county court in Michigan Territory, rendered in 1826 and regarding land within that 
county, was void for want of jurisdiction. In upholding the decree, the Court said, 
"These principles are settled as to all courts of record which have an original general 
jurisdiction over any particular subjects; they arc not courts of special or limited 
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discussed above, is susceptible to the interpretation that constitu-
tional "inferiority" is related to limited jurisdiction, except for tech-
nicalities, such as the requirement to establish jurisdiction in the 
proceedings, that such a status entailed at common law. 
The passage can also be read as referring to two distinct aspects 
of circuit courts-they are constitutionally inferior, and they are of 
limited jurisdiction.67 It is not clear whether the jurisdictional limit-
ation on the circuit courts inheres in the words "inferior Courts" or 
is imposed by article III, section 2. But if this limitation does inhere 
in "inferior Courts," it does not appear to be the entire definition 
of that term. 
Chief Justice Ellsworth also equated the circuit courts with the 
supreme (superior) courts of the common law. Since the circuit courts 
are constitutionally inferior, and since they are equated with common 
law superior courts, which were inferior only in that their decisions 
could be appealed to higher courts, it could be argued that "inferior" 
as used in the Constitution includes the element of appellate in-
feriority. Thus, the language could be understood as saying that the 
circuit courts, like the superior courts of England, are inferior in 
the appellate sense, although, unlike the superior courts, they are of 
limited jurisdiction.68 
jurisdiction, they are not inferior courts, in the technical sense of the term, because 
an appeal lies from their decisions .••• [The jurisdiction] of courts of the United 
States is limited and special, and their proceedings are reversible on error, but are 
not nullities, which may be entirely disregarded." 43 U.S. at 342, citing 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 
at 205. This case seems to be the product of the peculiar nature of the court's juris-
diction, i.e., in rem jurisdiction over land, rather than in personam jurisdiction over 
individuals. See 43 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 338. 
67. See also Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Banlc, 308 U.S. 371, 376 
(1940); Dowell v. Applegate, 152 U.S. 327, 337-40 (1894); Ex parte Cuddy, 131 U.S. 280, 
285-86 (1889); Kennedy v. Banlc of the State of Georgia, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 586, 611-12 
(1850). 
68. The Michigan supreme court reached a similar conclusion with respect to the 
meaning of "inferior courts" in the federal Constitution. In Swift v. Judges of the 
Circuit Court, 64 Mich. 479 (1887), it concluded: 
The term "inferior" is not of one single meaning in law, but is used in different 
senses. Under the Constitution of the United States, Congress has no power to 
create courts which are not inferior to the Supreme Court. The cases cited by 
counsel from the decisions of that court do not claim that the circuit and district 
courts are not inferior to the Supreme Court, but merely that, being courts of 
general powers and of record, they are not inferior courts in the sense in which 
that word is sometimes used to distinguish courts among themselves after their 
kind. In England, error lay to the common pleas out of the king's bench, making 
the former, in our constitutional sense, inferior to the latter, while both ranked as 
superior courts. So all of them were subject to review by the exchequer chamber, 
and that by the house of lords. Our American constitutional use of the word refers 
to relative rank and authority, and not to intrinsic quality. Under our own Consti• 
tution, as under that of the United States, the Supreme Court could have no 
appellate power or supervision over the circuit courts except on this idea that they 
are inferior to it, for none but inferior courts are subjected to it, and the juris• 
diction of our circuit courts are subjected to it, and the jurisdiction of our circuit 
courts equals that of the English superior courts. 
64 Mich. at 481 (Campbell, C.J.). 
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There is support for the view that inferior federal courts are 
inferior in an appellate sense. In an ejectment action, Kempe's 
Lessee v. Kennedy, 69 the plaintiff, whose lands had been confiscated 
under a New Jersey treason statute, collaterally attacked the con-
fiscatory decree of the New Jersey inferior county court of com-
mon pleas for want of jurisdiction. Chief Justice Marshall, writing 
for the Court, said in dictum without reference to Turner, 
All courts from which an appeal lies are inferior courts in rela-
tion to the appellate court before which their judgment may be car-
ried; but they are not therefore inferior courts in the technical sense 
of those words. They apply to courts of a special and limited juris-
diction, which are erected on such principles that their judgments, 
taken alone, are entirely disregarded, and the proceedings must show 
their jurisdiction. The courts of the United States are all of limited 
jurisdiction, and their proceedings are erroneous, if the jurisdiction 
be not shown upon them. Judgments rendered in such cases may 
certainly be reversed, but this court is not prepared to say that they 
are absolute nullities, which may be totally disregarded.70 
A probable reading of this opinion is that United States lower 
courts are inferior in that they are of limited jurisdiction, but that, 
unlike English inferior courts, their judgments are not void but only 
voidable, through appeal, for a failure to state jurisdiction. Marshall 
also discusses appellate inferiority, which he thought was character-
istic of the federal courts. 
The validity of this interpretation is supported by Durousseau v. 
United States,71 decided the next year. Congress had established a 
69. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 173 (1809). 
70. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 185. One year later this dictum became law, at least as it 
applied to circuit courts. In Skillem's Exr. v. May's Exr., IO U.S. (6 Cranch) 267 (1810), 
the Supreme Court had already reversed and remanded the case to the circuit court, 
when it was objected that jurisdiction was not shown in the original circuit court 
proceedings. The Court, without discussion, ordered its decree carried out. It thus 
became clear that the requirement that jurisdiction be shown, a key aspect of the 
common law definition of inferior courts, did not apply to United States circuit courts. 
71. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307 (1810). See also Bank of United States v. Moss, 47 U.S. 
(6 How.) 31 (1848). In Moss the plaintiff won a judgment in the United States Circuit 
Court for the Southern District of Mississippi in November term, but in May term tlte 
court reversed itself for want of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court ordered the first 
verdict reinstated, ruling, on the basis of Kempe's Lessee and M'Cormich (see note 66 
supra), that it was valid until duly reversed on appeal. The Court reasoned that this 
was necessary, 
(b]ecause it would be a judgment rendered by a court, not of inferior, but only 
limited, jurisdiction •••• This view is supported by the English doctrine. There, 
though judgments of inferior courts ••• are often void, when on their face clearly 
without their jurisdiction, and may be proved to be so and avoided without a 
writ or error ••• yet the judgment of a superior court is not void, but only 
voidable by plea on error. 
47 U.S. at 40. First, the Court distinguished between courts of inferior and courts of 
limited jurisdiction and found the circuit courts to be of the latter type. Second, it 
compared circuit courts with common law superior courts. If they are comparable, and 
December 1973] Notes 303 
district court in the territory of Orleans and had given the one judge 
the "same jurisdiction and powers, which are by law given to, or 
may be exercised by the judge of Kentucky district.''72 While agree-
ing that, because Congress had made a general grant of powers in the 
Judiciary Act, jurisdiction not given to the Supreme Court by Con-
gress was impliedly excepted,73 Marshall rejected the argument that, 
because the statute creating the Orleans court made no express pro-
vision for Supreme Court review, no writ of error lay from the 
Supreme Court to the Orleans court: 
It is believed to be the true intent of the legislature to place [the 
Orleans court] precisely on the same footing of the court of Kentucky, 
in every respect, and to subject their judgments, in the same manner, 
to the revision of the supreme court. Otherwise the court of Orleans 
would, in fact, be a supreme court. It would possess greater and less 
restricted powers than the court of Kentucky, which is, in terms, an 
inferior court.74 
Marshall seems to assume that the term "inferior Courts" means "is 
subject to appellate review" unless the Congress states otherwise. 
His statement that a court that was not reviewable "would, in fact, 
be a supreme court" even implies that appellate inferiority may be 
mandated by the term "inferior Courts." 
F. The National Court of Appeals 
It does not appear that the framers adopted either a common 
law or a colonial definition of "inferior courts.'' Article I, section 8, 
clause 9, indicates that courts created by Congress must be inferior 
to the Supreme Court in some sense. There is judicial support for 
the view that this means that their decisions must be subject to 
Supreme Court review in some classes of cases, although the Judi-
ciary Act of 1789 makes clear that this requirement need not apply 
to all or even most decisions. 
The history of the inferior federal courts supports the view that 
a court must be subject to review in some cases if it is to be inferior. 
From their inception, the district and circuit courts were subject to 
at least limited review by the Supreme Court.75 Today, the Supreme 
if circuit courts arc inferior within the meaning of the Constitution, then it appears 
that the definition of constitutional inferior courts would include appellate inferiority, 
since that was the only inferior aspect of the superior courts. See text accompanying 
note 68 supra. 
72. Act of March 26, 1804, ch. 38, § 1, 2 Stat. 286, quoted in 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 
at 312. 
73. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 314. 
74. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 318. 
75. See text accompanying notes 56-57 supra. 
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Court has direct or indirect76 review through appeal or certiorari of 
the circuit courts of appeals, 77 the district courts, 78 the Court of 
Claims,79 the Tax Court,80 the Court of Customs,81 the Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals,82 the courts of bankruptcy,88 the ter-
ritorial courts,84 and the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals.80 
The interpretation of "inferior Courts" as requiring some appel-
late review also seems necessary as a practical matter. If "inferior 
Courts" were interpreted to allow the creation of courts of limited 
jurisdiction that were free from all substantive review by the 
Supreme Court, Congress could create a court to hear and finally 
decide all first amendment claims, and another to finally decide all 
equal protection claims, and so on. Such courts, under the guise of 
an inferiority based on limited jurisdiction, could, if carried to an 
extreme, entirely usurp the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. 
The decisions of the Freund Commission's National Court of 
Appeals would be entirely free of Supreme Court review. The only 
cases on which the Supreme Court would pass would be the 400 to 
500 cases that the National Court of Appeals would certify to the 
Supreme Court each year. But the fact that the Supreme Court 
would peruse those cases could hardly be classified as review by that 
Court of the National Court, for no adverse decisions by the Na-
tional Court of Appeals would be examined.86 
It appears that if the National Court of Appeals were subject to 
the Supreme Court's superintending control then it would be an 
inferior court in an appellate sense.87 The Freund Commission, how-
76. Often the Supreme Court's power of review is exercised indirectly; for example, 
district court cases usually reach the Supreme Court only after they have been reviewed 
by the circuit courts of appeals. 
77. 28 u.s.c. § 1254 (1970). 
78, 28 u.s.c. §§ 1253, 1291 (1970). 
79. 28 u.s.c. §§ 1252, 1255 (1970). 
80. 26 u.s.c. § 7482 (1970). 
81. 28 u.s.c. § 1256 (1970). 
82. 28 u.s.c. §§ 1252, 1256 (1970). 
83. 11 u.s.c. § 47 (1970). 
84. 28 u.s.c. § 1291 (1970). 
85. Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, § 211, 85 
Stat. 748, extended by Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1973, Pub. L. No, 
93-28, § 8, 87 Stat. 29. The Emergency Court of Appeals in existence during World 
War II was also subject to Supreme Court review·. Act of Jan, 30, 1942, ch. 26, § 204(c), 
56Stat. 32. 
86. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 175 (1803). 
87. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970) states: "(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established 
by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their 
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." As a result, 
the Supreme Court cannot grant writs of mandamus, prohibition, or certiorari unless 
it possesses either original or appellate jurisdiction over the case. See In re Glaser, 198 
U.S. 171 (1905), in which the Court refused to issue mandamus to a circuit court 
because it had no appellate jurisdiction over circuit courts in tort cases. This lack of 
jurisdiction had resulted when Congress interposed the circuit courts of appeals between 
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ever, apparently envisioned no superintending control. The Report 
makes no mention of such power, nor does it seem inherent in the 
Commission's proposal. Indeed, the opposite is implied: The pur-
pose of a National Court of Appeals is to save Supreme Court time, 
and subjecting the National Court of Appeals to the various writs 
would run directly against that objective. Even if such writs were 
only rarely granted, the Supreme Court would still face the task of 
reviewing all the petitions. Thus, although a National Court of 
Appeals that was subject to the superintending control of the 
Supreme Court would seem to be constitutionally inferior, it would 
not serve its intended purpose. 
II. THE DELEGATION OF SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION 
A. "one supreme Court" 
The framers, in rejecting a proposal for "one or more supreme 
tribunals," vested the original and ultimate appellate "judicial Power 
of the United States" in "one supreme Court."88 The proceedings 
of the Constitutional Convention establish that the framers envi-
sioned the one supreme Court as the principle instrumentality for 
implementing the supremacy clause, which states in article VI that 
the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States shall be the 
"supreme Law of the Land."89 
Since only one "supreme Court" is constitutionally allowed, the 
proposed National Court of Appeals would be constitutional only if 
it is an "inferior Court," rather than a "supreme Court." As Chief 
Justice Marshall suggested in Durousseau, a court not subject to 
Supreme Court review would be a supreme court itself.9° Congress 
cannot assign duties to a National Court of Appeals that would 
make it, in effect, a supreme court and that would emasculate the 
Supreme Court's power to execute its fundamental duty of declaring 
the "supreme Law of the Land."91 
B. Ex parte McCardle 
Former Chief Justice Warren, in his attack on the Freund Com-
mission proposal, cites debates during the Constitutional Conven-
the Supreme Court and the circuit courts in 1891. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 5, 
26 Stat. 827. See also In re Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 482 (1905); C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL 
COURTS 497 (1970). The statute establishing the National Court of Appeals could, of 
course, carve out an exception to the All Writs Act and give the Supreme Court the 
power to issue writs to the National Court of Appeals. 
88. See notes 36-37 supra. 
89. See Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 157, 161-65 (1960). 
90. See text accompanying note 74 supra. 
91. There are extensive discussions on whether the proposed court would be 
violative of the provision for "one supreme Court" in the articles cited at note 7 supra. 
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tion as evidence that Congress cannot delegate the jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court to the lower federal courts. 02 He concludes that, 
since the proposal would delegate Supreme Court power, it would 
be unconstitutional in that respect. 
The major statement by the Supreme Court on this question was 
in Ex parte A1cCardle.93 In 1867, Congress gave the Supreme Court 
appellate jurisdiction over cases granting or denying writs of habeas 
corpus.94 In 1868, newspaper editor McCardle, convicted by a mili-
tary commission in Mississippi, appealed an adverse decision by the 
circuit court on his petition for habeas corpus to the Supreme 
Court.05 The Court heard argument in March 1868, but, because of 
the absence of the Chief Justice, who was presiding over the impeach-
ment of President Johnson, it took the case under advisement. While 
the case was sub judice, Congress, fearing that the Court, in its de-
cision, would declare the Reconstruction Acts unconstitutional, took 
away, by the Act of March 27, 1868, the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court over writs of habeas corpus.96 When the Chief Justice re-
turned, the Court felt compelled to decide whether it was precluded 
by the new legislation from deciding the Mccardle case on the 
merits. The Court found: 
[We] are not at liberty to inquire into [Congress'] power under the 
Constitution; and the power to make exceptions to the appellate 
jurisdiction of this court is given by express words. 
What, then, is the effect of the repealing act upon the case before 
us? We cannot doubt as to this. Without jurisdiction, the court can-
not proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the 
law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the 
court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause .... 
92. 59 A.B.A.J. '721, supra note 6, at '730. See also Gressman, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
951, supra note 6, at 965-67. 
93. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868). Mccardle probably involved the best known attempt 
by Congress to control the Supreme Court. It was the culmination of a long line of 
cases that had repeatedly stated, although often in dictum, that the Court had no 
appellate jurisdiction except for that granted to it by Congress, See, e.g., Durousseau v. 
United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307 (1810); United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 
159 (1805); Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321 (1796). See also The "Francis Wright," 
105 U.S. 381 (1881). 
For an extensive discussion of Mc:Jardle and its implications, see Forkosch, Tlze 
Exceptions and Regulations Clause of Article III and a Person's Constitutional Rights: 
Can tlze Latter be Limited by Congressional Power Under t/ze Former?, 72 W. VA, L. 
REv. 238 (1970); Hart, T/ze Power of Congress to Limit t/ze Jurisdiction of Federal 
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1362 (1953); Lenoir, Congressional 
Control Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 5 KAN, L. REv. 16 (1956); 
Ratner, supra note 89. 
94. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, §§ 1-2, 14 Stat. 385. 
95. 2 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 465 (1932), 
96. Ch. 34, § 2, 15 Stat. 44. The Act was passed over the veto of the President, 
2 C. WARREN, supra note 95, at 465-80. 
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It is quite clear, therefore, that this court cannot proceed to pro-
nounce judgment in this case, for it has no longer jurisdiction of the 
appeal; and judicial duty is not less fitly performed by declining 
ungranted jurisdiction than in exercising firmly that which the 
Constitution and the laws confer.97 
The immediate effect of the decision was to make the circuit 
courts tribunals of last resort in cases of habeas corpus proceedings 
instituted in those courts. Thus, it could be argued that Congress 
can delegate the final decision in any case by cutting off appeal to 
the Supreme Court. This delegation could arguably be effected by 
creating a new court and vesting it with certain jurisdiction, while 
simultaneously removing that same jurisdiction from the Supreme 
Court. This congressional power arises from the exceptions-and-
regulations clause to article III, section 2. It appears, however, even 
though the delegation is permissible, it must still be made to a 
court that is "inferior" under the terms of article III, section 1. 
The immediate question that arises is whether a modified Na-
tional Court of Appeals subject to review by the Supreme Court in a 
very narrow range of cases would fall within the purview of Mc-
Cardle?98 The broadest interpretation of Mccardle is that Congress 
can take away all appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. A 
narrower interpretation, limited to the facts of the case, is that Con-
gress can deny or repeal appellate jurisdiction only if the issue in-
volved can reach the Court via another route.99 Most interpretations 
offered fall within these extremes.100 
97. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 514-15. 
98. Such a modified proposal has been made by Judge Haynsworth. See Haynsworth, 
A New Court to ImprCJtJe the Administration of Justice, 59 A.B.A.J. 841 (1973). 
Haynsworth's proposed court would be essentially like the proposed National Court of 
Appeals except that it would deal only with criminal convictions involving federal 
questions. The significant difference is that "the Supreme Court's power of supervision 
and its overlordship [would be preserved since provision would be] made for petitions 
to the Supreme Court for certiorari when (1) the new court decided the case on its 
merits, and (2) certiorari was denied by the new court but one or more of its members 
expressed the opinion that certiorari should be granted." The Supreme Court would 
also, on its own motion, be able to issue certiorari "to the new court or to the lower 
court from which the case came." Id. at 843. 
99. In Mccardle the Court noted that it still had jurisdiction over habeas corpus 
conferred by other statutes. 74 U.S. at 515. One commentator notes that the Court 
could review habeas corpus via a two-writ procedure of habeas corpus and certiorari 
under a procedural reform passed in 1842, and that therefore Congressional removal 
of the 1867 procedure was nothing more than a procedural regulation of, rather than 
an exception to, the Court's appellate jurisdiction. Forkosch, supra note 93, at 250. 
100. Although McCardle was approved in passing by Justice Harlan in Glidden Co. 
v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 567 (1962), Justice Douglas, in dissent, expressed doubt as to 
whether that same decision would be reached today. 370 U.S. at 605 n.11. However, 
subsequent cases have also affirmed Mccardle in passing. See Chandler v. Judicial 
Council, 398 U.S. 74, 111 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 
109 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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Leonard Ratner has concluded that the limitation by Congress 
of the Court's appellate jurisdiction cannot interfere with the func-
tions of the Court in the constitutional plan.101 These functions are 
(1) to declare the supreme law of the land; (2) to provide for the ulti-
mate resolution of inconsistent interpretations of federal law by 
state and federal courts; and (3) to ensure the supremacy of federal 
over state law where the nvo conflict.102 
Ratner finds support for the existence of these related functions 
in the presence of the supremacy clause,103 for the clause would be 
a hollow exhortation if there were no tribunal with nationwide 
authority.104 The proceedings of the Constitutional Convention make 
it clear that the framers intended to make the Supreme Court the 
principal instrumentality for implementing the supremacy clause.10G 
Ratner also finds direct support in early Supreme Court decisions.106 
His statement of functions seems to be a particularization of the 
rule espoused by Professor Hart in his classic work on Mccardle: 
The exceptions-and-regulations clause of article III, section 2, gives 
Congress the power to make exceptions to the Court's appellate 
jurisdiction short of destroying its role in the constitutional plan.107 
101. Ratner, supra note 89, at 201·02. 
102. Ratner, supra note 89, at 160-67. Forkosch is in general agreement with Ratner, 
except that he would interpret the limitation in terms of "irreducible minimums," 
which would include a person's substantive constitutional rights in that portion of 
jurisdiction immune from Congressional control, Forkosch, supra note 93, at 256-57, 
See also Lenoir, supra note 93. But see Merry, Scope of the Supreme Court's Appellate 
Jurisdiction: Historical Basis, 47 MINN. L. R:Ev. 53 (1962), which concludes that article 
ill, section 2, allows Congress to exempt only matters of fact from Supreme Court 
jurisdiction and that jurisdiction over matters of law is conferred on the Supreme 
Court by the Constitution. 
103. U.S. Const. art. VI. 
104. Ratner, supra note 89, at 160-61. 
105. Id. at 161-65. 
106. Id. at 166-67. The cases discussed are Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 
Wheat.) 304 (1806); Cohen v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821); and Ableman v, 
:Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858). 
107. Hart, supra note 93, at 1364-65: 
Q. :But even assuming the obligation, and I gather it's something of an assump• 
tion, only the Supreme Court can enforce it if the state courts balk. The Mccardle 
case says that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is entirely within 
Congressional control. 
A. You read the Mccardle case for all it might be worth rather than the least it 
has to be worth, don't you? 
Q. No. I read it in terms of the language of the Constitution and the anteced-
ent theory that the Court articulated in explaining its decision. This seems to me 
to lead inevitably to the same result, whatever jurisdiction is denied to the Court. 
A. You would treat the Constitution, then, as authorizing exceptions which 
engulf the rule, even to the point of eliminating the appellate jurisdiction alto• 
gether? How preposterous! 
Q. If you think an "exception" implies some residuum of jurisdiction, Congress 
could meet that test by excluding everything but patent cases, This is so absurd, 
and it is so impossible to lay down any measure of a necessary reservation, that it 
seems to me that the language of the Constitution must be taken as vesting plenary 
control in Congress. 
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The delicate system of checks and balances erected by the framers 
and their clearly expressed desire for an independent judiciary108 
also suggest this limitation. Those functions enumerated by Pro-
fessor Ratner seem to comprise the minimum of what the Court 
must do to effectuate its role in a tripartite, federal system. 
C. The National Court of Appeals 
How would a National Court of Appeals subject in some class 
of cases to review by the Supreme Court fit within these guidelines? 
The Freund Commission's proposal that the National Court of 
Appeals screen certiorari petitions involves significant delegation 
questions. The Supreme Court in both denying and granting cer-
tiorari performs functions important in the constitutional plan. 
The view that denial of certiorari is no more than a refusal to 
hear a given case, and is thus a neutral decision, is too simplistic.109 
Some of the most important things that the Supreme Court does are 
done through the various techniques of "not doing," one of which 
is the denial of certiorari.110 Professor Bickel acknowledges that 
"[i]t is plain ... that most denials of certiorari and many dismissals 
of appeals are entirely neutral means"111 and that "denial of cer-
tiorari is not an adjudication of the issues tendered, let alone an 
affirmance of the judgment below. A denial is an avoidance of ad-
A. It's not impossible for me to lay down a measure. The measure is simply 
that the exceptions must not be such as will destroy the essential role of the 
Supreme Court in the constitutional plan. Mccardle, you will remember, meets 
that test. The circuit courts of the United States were still open in habeas corpus, 
and the Supreme Court itself could still entertain petitions for the writ which 
were filed with it in the first instance. 
Q. The measure seems pretty indeterminate to me. 
A. Ask yourself whether it is any more so than the tests which the Court has 
evolved to meet other hard situations. But whatever the difficulties of the test, 
they are less, are they not, than the difficulties of reading the Constitution as au-
thorizing its own destruction? 
Q. Has the Supreme Court ever done or said anything to suggest that it is 
prepared to adopt the view you are stating? 
A. No, it has never had occasion to. Congress so far has never tried to destroy 
the Constitution. 
See also Ratner, supra note 89, at 168-202. 
108. See, e.g., 2 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 45 (Madison), 429 (Wilson & Randolph). 
109. Although a denial of certiorari should have no precedential value, see, e.g., 
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 491-92 (1953), the Supreme Court has, on occasion, given 
a certiorari denial more credit than should be due: "Thus, although a denial of 
certiorari normally carries no implication or inference ••• the pointed dissents • • • to 
the denial in Garland so soon after Boddie, and Mr. Justice Harlan's failure to join 
the dissenters, surely are not without some significance as to their and the Court's 
attitude about the application of the Boddie principle to bankruptcy fees." United 
States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 443 (1973). See Justice Marshall's criticism on this reliance 
on a denial of certiorari. 409 U.S. at 460-61 (dissenting opinion). 
no. A. BICKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH 112 (1962). See generally id. at 
lll-94. 
lll. Id. at 169. 
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judication of the merits."112 Still, he recognizes that grants or denials 
of certiorari are important enough that they cannot be decided with-
out some principled, although flexible, standards and that certiorari 
decisions can therefore be wrongly decided.113 Furthermore, the 
rightness or wrongness of these decisions may necessarily involve the 
merits.114 Coupled with the other "evasive techniques" available to 
the Supreme Court, certiorari gives the Court a needed degree of 
flexibility in its decision-making process.115 Consequently, a sig-
nificant measure of judicial power inheres in the nonadjudicatory 
practice of certiorari.116 
While Bick.el speaks only of instances where certiorari was incor-
rectly granted, it is probable that there are cases where it is ,vrongly 
denied. This probability is likely to be increased when the judges 
of the National Court of Appeals begin making certiorari decisions 
based on their perceptions of what the justices of the Supreme Court 
might think.117 
In addition to possible error by the National Court of Appeals, 
there is a danger that the Supreme Court justices, through their 
decreased exposure to petitions, would lose their feel for the issues 
and cases tliat merit review.118 This would result in an increased 
number of incorrect decisions on the 400 to 500 certiorari petitions 
that will be reviewed by the Supreme Court itself. 
It therefore appears that the delegation of certiorari decisions to 
the National Court of Appeals would, by stripping the Supreme 
Court of an important discretionary, albeit nonadjudicatory, func-
tion, interfere with the Court's basic role in that it would de-
prive the Court of needed flexibility.119 In addition, to the extent 
112. Id. at 142. 
113. Id. at 132-33. For example, Bickel asserts that certiorari was wrongly granted 
in Times Film Coxp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961). 
114. A. BICKEL, supra note llO, at 134. 
115. Id. at 171. See also Gressman, 41 GEo, WASH. L. REv. 951, supra note 6, at 
959 n.21. 
116. Indeed, Bickel intimates that certiorari is of such import that it should per-
haps require a majority vote, rather than the four votes required under the present 
system. A. BICKEL, supra note llO, at 142. 
117. This is particularly true in an area of apparently "settled" law. The National 
Court of Appeals might deny certiorari because the lower court's ruling is in con-
formity with a prior Supreme Court ruling, while, for various reasons, the Court 
itself might be willing to reconsider the issue. Thus, the National Court of Appeals 
could conceivably breed conservatism and stagnation. See Brennan, supra note 6, at 
482; 59 A.B.A.J. 721, supra note 6, at 728-29. 
The report dismisses the importance of this loss of control quickly and simplisticly 
by assuming that "the Supreme Court's readiness to reopen what had seemed to be 
settled issues, its impatience with, or its interest in, one or another category of cases 
-all this, we think, would communicate itself to the National Court of Appeals, and 
would be acted upon." REPORT, supra note I, at 23. 
US. Brennan, supra note 6, at 476-79. 
l19. "In my view, the screening function is inextricably Jinked to the fulfillment of 
December 1973] Notes 311 
that the National Court of Appeals wrongly denies certiorari, the 
Supreme Court would be deprived of an opportunity to declare the 
supreme law of the land. The Court's decreased sensitivity, resulting 
from a lack of exposure to certiorari petitions, would also impair 
its ability to perform its necessary duties. 
The delegation of circuit conflicts to the National Court of 
Appeals also presents problems, not the least of which is the ques-
tion of what cases that court will decide. It will be assumed here 
that the Congress, or the two courts themselves, can clearly define 
a class of cases of minor importance over which the National Court 
of Appeals will have final jurisdiction. 
If decisions on conflicts between circuits by the National Court 
of Appeals are not reviewable, its assumption of this function 
would clash with the Supreme Court's function of declaring the 
supreme law of the land and of ensuring its uniform application. 
Since these decisions, however, would be of minor import, an argu-
ment can be made that this interference would be de minimus. The 
strength of this argument increases if "minor" is understood as 
meaning "insignificant" and decreases if it means "nonmajor." This 
question cannot be resolved until the types of decisions that the 
National Court of Appeals will decide are outlined. At this stage, it 
seems that a significant constitutional roadblock of unknown size 
is around the bend. 
To the extent that a modified proposal provides for review of 
either denials of certiorari or final decisions of circuit conflicts, or 
both, the constitutional problem of delegation diminishes with re-
spect to that class of cases made reviewable by the Supreme Court. 
Judge Haynsworth has proposed a court similar to the proposed 
National Court of Appeals but with provision for review by the 
Supreme Court.120 Such a court would seem to be free of the infe-
riority objection, and of the delegation problem as well. The pro-
posal provides for three classes of certiorari decisions. Those cases 
receiving the required vote in the National Court of Appeals would 
automatically be passed on to the Supreme Court for final deter-
mination. Those cases receiving no votes would be dismissed. There 
would be some provision, however, for granting review on the 
Supreme Court's mm motion. Those cases receiving one or more 
votes but less than is required for automatic certification could be 
reviewed by the Supreme Court at its discretion. In effect, this 
the Court's essential duties and is vital to the effective performance of the Court's 
unique mission 'to define the rights guaranteed by the Constitution, to assure the 
uniformity of federal law, and to maintain the constitutional distribution of powers 
in our federal union.' " Brennan, supra note 6, at 482, quoting REPORT, supra note I, 
at 1. 
120. See note 98 supra. Judge Haynsworth's proposed court would deal only with 
criminal cases. 
312 Michigan Law Review [Vol. '12:290 
would give the Court a two-step decision on the second type of 
case. It would first have to decide whether it should exercise its dis-
cretion or act on its own motion, and, if it so chooses, it would then 
have to decide certiorari. Thus, where once the Court made a single 
determination, it would now make two. The middle stage of the 
proposal can also be viewed as simply lowering the required vote 
for certification by the National Court to the minimum number re-
quired to place a case in the discretionary class. It seems, therefore, 
that this system would result in little, if any, time saving for the 
Supreme Court.121 
If final National Court of Appeals' resolutions of circuit con-
flicts would be allowed Supreme Court review, while decisions on 
certiorari would be final in all cases, the National Court of Appeals 
would seem to be an "inferior court," for it would be subject to re-
view in one class of cases. In addition, this proposal would save more 
of the Supreme Court's time than Judge Haynsworth's proposal 
since circuit conflicts are apparently envisioned as comprising a very 
minor portion of the National Court of Appeals' caseload.122 There 
are nvo practical objections to this arrangement. First, it does not 
seem practical to delegate a class of cases to the National Court of 
Appeals on the premise of saving Supreme Court time when the 
cases are ultimately reviewable by the Court.128 Second, there is the 
problem of subjecting the litigants in these cases to an additional 
level of appellate review. More importantly, the proposal would be 
confronted by the delegation problem of unreviewable certiorari 
denials. 
Thus, the proposals for a National Court of Appeals involve in-
herent conflicts between the constitutional requirement of inferiority 
and the prohibition on impermissible delegation of Supreme Court 
authority, on the one hand, and practicality, on the other. Different, 
more acceptable solutions to the problem of the heavy Supreme Court 
workload should be formulated. 
121. While it could be contended that the Court would still be saved the trouble 
of deciding certiorari on those cases receiving less than the minimum vote, this argu-
ment is unpersuasive. Since the National Court is to certify all cases even arguably 
worthy of Supreme Court review, those cases in which the court would refuse to grant 
certiorari would be of the type that consumes little, if any, Supreme Court time. 
Gressman, 59 A.B.A.J. 253, supra note 6, at 254; Brennan, supra note 6, at 476-77. 
These are the cases that the Supreme Court itself would quickly find unworthy of 
certiorari. 
122. REPORT, supra note 1, at 18-24. In discussing the proposal for the new court 
the report makes only scant mention of this function. 
123. It has been noted, however, that, even as proposed, the National Court of 
Appeals would save little if any Supreme Court time. E.g., Gressman, 59 A.B.A.J. 253, 
supra note 6, at 258. 
